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Marriage Equality and The “New” 
Maternalism 
Cynthia Godsoe* 
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now ask whether Michigan may 
continue to deny them the certainty and stability all mothers desire to 
protect their children, and for them and their children the childhood 
years will pass all too soon. 
--Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 
The battle over same-sex marriage centered on children, with both sides 
claiming to be the guardians of children’s welfare.1 Opponents’ arguments 
were based on faulty science2 and, as Justice Kennedy noted in Obergefell, 
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 1. Cynthia Godsoe, Adopting the Gay Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(outlining these arguments). Justice Kennedy also noted the harm that same-sex marriage bans cause 
children: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, the[] children [of 
same-sex couples] suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer 
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents. . . .” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
 2. The arguments about the outcomes of children raised by same-sex parents were not 
emphasized in the Supreme Court, likely because the Sixth Circuit decision on appeal focused on 
arguments about institutional roles and who should decide the issue of same-sex marriage. The 
welfare of these children, however, dominated the lower court cases, including one of the cases the 
Sixth Circuit reversed. The only two federal courts holding hearings on this issue both discredited the 
experts and research purporting to claim that children raised by same-sex parents fare any worse than 
other children. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 
388 (6th Cir. 2014). The court in this case found defendant’s sociologist Mark Regnerus and his 
research “entirely unbelievable and not worthy of serious consideration” and defendant’s other experts 
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belied by the real-world experience of thousands of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) families.3 Certainly, marriage equality represents a victory 
for diverse families. Yet the focus on children has also had the detrimental 
impact of imposing a traditional parenthood paradigm. Specifically, Obergefell 
reflects a maternalist philosophy wherein a woman’s perceived natural and 
limited role is as an all-sacrificing mother virtually inseparable from her 
children.4 Despite deciding against opponents of same-sex marriage, the 
opinion inadvertently endorses their gendered parenting arguments.5 Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy’s praise for the ideal motherhood of DeBoer and Rowse 
carries disturbing echoes of his prior opinion restricting access to abortion in 
Gonzales v. Carhart.6 
Motherhood remains one of the most powerful and vigorously enforced 
social roles.7 “[L]oaded with normative content,” the term evokes a “prototype, 
which serves as a measure by which real-life mothers in all their diversity are 
judged.”8 The ongoing salience of idealized maternity for gender roles calls 
 
“largely unbelievable,” concluding that defendants’ experts “clearly represent a fringe viewpoint that 
is rejected by the vast majority of their colleagues across a variety of social science fields.” Id. at 766–
68. The district court also noted that Regnerus’s research “has been widely and severely criticized by 
other scholars” and that his own institution, the University of Texas, distanced itself from Regnerus 
and supported the plaintiffs’ view of the research on children raised by same-sex parents. Id. at 766. In 
contrast, the court found all of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses “highly credible” and accorded their 
testimony “considerable” or “great” weight. Id. at 761–65; see also Perry v. Schwarznegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declining to treat defendant’s only witness on children raised by 
same-sex parents as an expert and finding his testimony “inadmissible” and “essentially [of] no 
weight”). 
 3. See, e.g., 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving 
and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. . . .This provides powerful 
confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families.”). 
 4. See Anita L. Allen, Atmospherics: Abortion Law and Philosophy (defining maternalism as 
an “assumption that bearing children and caring for others is the natural and optimal role of women”), 
in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 184, 186 (Francis J. Moontz III ed., 2011). There is wide 
variation in the definition of maternalism. Some feminists, for instance, embrace women’s purported 
caregiving virtues as a beneficial counterpoint to the dominant masculine focus on reason and justice. 
See Feminist Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-political [http://perma.cc/YJ8L-G8MS] (describing the 
social difference feminism of Carol Gilligan and others). Here, I focus on the less positive aspects of 
maternalism, as well as maternalism imposed on women rather than asserted by them. 
 5. Opponents of same-sex marriage have argued that dual-gendered parenting is important 
for child welfare, and thus can justify bans on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 
39, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-571) WL 1384104 (“Men and women 
are different, and having both a man and a woman as part of the parenting team could reasonably be 
thought to be a good idea . . . [M]others and fathers provide different benefits . . . to children”); see 
also id. at 33 (“Michigan’s marriage policy tries to maximize the likelihood that every child will know 
and be raised by his or her mother and father whenever possible.”). 
 6. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). For further discussion, see infra notes 57–63. 
 7. JODI VANDENBERG-DAVES, MODERN MOTHERHOOD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 164 
(2014) (“Again and again, Americans have infused motherhood with cultural and political 
significance.”). 
 8. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 286–87 (2d ed. 
2003). 
2015] MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND THE “NEW” MATERNALISM 147 
into question the real novelty of any type of maternalism. Instead, various 
iterations of maternalism implement what Reva Siegel has termed 
“preservation through transformation.”9 Obergefell continues this trend. The 
focus on the female plaintiffs’ maternity, in contrast to the focus on the male 
plaintiffs’ occupations, mirrors the nineteenth century concept of separate 
spheres; women are guardians of the private home sphere while men dominate 
the public professional and civic sphere. When women, like DeBoer and 
Rowse, enter the public sphere, they do so as an extension of their maternal 
role to safeguard children and families. The description of three plaintiff 
couples in Obergefell reinscribes this essentialist and gendered paradigm.10 
This Essay explores the maternalism infusing the Obergefell opinion and 
argues that it expresses a traditional view of women’s place in the family and 
in the public sphere. Part I outlines the long history of maternalism and its dual 
harms of limiting all women’s roles while ignoring many women, particularly 
low-income women and women of color, who do not fit the ideal mother 
paradigm. Part II connects Obergefell to the more obvious sex-stereotyping in 
Carhart, drawing parallels between the idealization of motherhood in the two 
opinions. To be clear, I do not purport to engage in a comprehensive discussion 
of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence or of the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
mothers.11 Nor am I arguing that Obergefell should have come out differently. 
On the contrary, I wholeheartedly support the recognition of same-sex 
marriage as a fundamental right.12 Rather, I am making the limited, but 
important, point that we cannot assume that a progressive decision is inherently 
feminist.13 Traditional assumptions about male and female roles continue to 
permeate many aspects of family law, particularly parenthood. The ongoing 
gendered stereotypes embedded in Obergefell limit marriage equality’s 
egalitarian power, ultimately restricting options for all families. 
 
 9. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L. J. 2117, 2119, 2184 (1996). 
 10. See infra notes 59–62 (outlining how the court describes the female plaintiffs with almost 
exclusively terms of maternity, while the numerous male plaintiffs who are fathers are ignored). 
 11. Commentators have noted that Justice Kennedy “essentializes maternity” in at least one 
other opinion. See, e.g., Hiram Perez, How to Rehabilitate A Mulatto: The Iconography of Tiger 
Woods (describing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), where Justice Kennedy upheld different rules 
for nonmarital children born abroad to a U.S. mother from those born to a U.S. father), in ASIAN 
AMERICAN STUDIES NOW: A CRITICAL READER 405, 417 (Jean Yu-Wen Shen Yu & Thomas Chen 
eds., 2010). Here, I focus on Carhart and Obergefell, the two cases where motherhood is most 
discussed. 
 12. By this support, I do not intend to endorse Obergefell’s failure to recognize LGBT people 
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class deserving of heightened Equal Protection scrutiny. As others have 
argued, such a holding would have best protected the rights of LGBT people in the future. See, e.g., 
Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 137 (2015). 
 13. Feminism has many variations. I use it here broadly to describe, inter alia, a theory about 
the subordination of women and a struggle against that subordination. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT 
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17–20 (2006). 
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I. 
MATERNALISM 
Historically, a woman’s role as mother has served as both a pedestal and 
a prison.14 A cult of domesticity beginning in the post-Civil War and Victorian 
eras revered women’s maternal “dedication to her family and selfless support 
of the domestic sphere.”15 Motherhood was conceived of both as a woman’s 
essential nature and as her public and private role in the highly gendered 
separate spheres arising out of the Industrial Revolution.16 Deemed essential to 
the healthy development of future male citizens, “mother-love” served as a 
“fundamental pillar of the nation’s social and political order.”17 Accordingly, 
women’s function in the home determined their public role, not as workers or 
citizens, but as the guardians of the next generation. 
Maternalism describes both a vision of women and a related 
sociopolitical system. It posits women as innately nurturing and morally 
directive, and accordingly limits their public role to “the ‘natural’ caretakers 
and nurturers . . . of the extended social family, or state.”18 This “moral 
motherhood” philosophy explicitly informed both law and policy from the 
mid-nineteenth century well into the twentieth.19 The Supreme Court upheld 
restrictions on women’s labor to protect women’s “performance of maternal 
functions.”20 Historians have described how women’s civic activism, centered 
not only on feeding the poor, but on guiding them morally.21 The small number 
of middle- and -upper-middle-class women employed in the early twentieth 
 
 14. Ruth H. Bloch, American Feminine Ideals in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother 
(describing how maternity “held a special place of honor” while female activity was simultaneously 
“contracted into the preoccupations of motherhood”), in 4 FEMINIST STUDIES 100, 120 (1978) . 
 15. Carolyn A. Weber, Maternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY 523, 523 
(J. O’Brien ed., 2009). A fuller outline of this history is beyond the scope of this piece; for such an 
account, readers can refer to a recent comprehensive history of American motherhood. VANDENBERG-
DAVES, supra note 7. 
 16. NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMAN’S SPHERE IN NEW ENGLAND, 
1780–1835, at 63 (1977). Social reformers urged middle-class women unable to conceive to adopt 
children as their civic duty; “[I]f adoptive mothers could not claim status as real mothers, they 
could at least receive credit as superior citizens.” Julie Berebitsky, Redefining Real Motherhood: 
Representation of Adoptive Mothers, 1900–1950, in IMAGINING ADOPTION: ESSAYS ON 
LITERATURE AND CULTURE 83, 86 (Marianne Novy ed., 2004). 
 17. REBECCA JO PLANT, MOM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MOTHERHOOD IN MODERN 
AMERICA 4–5 (2010). 
 18. Weber, supra note 15. 
 19. Bloch, supra note 14, at 100 (describing the maternal ideal from its rise in the early 
nineteenth century, to its strengthening in Victorian times, and finally, to its peak in the mid-twentieth 
century); see also VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 7, at 48, 114, 119, 125 (describing how the 
ideology of moral motherhood began in the nineteenth century and infused social policies and culture 
through the first half of the twentieth century). 
 20. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 21. Two seminal accounts of maternalist social welfare activism are THEDA SKOCPOL, 
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1992) and LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE 
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890–1935 (1998). 
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century mostly took on the quasi-maternal roles of teachers and social 
workers.22 
This model was limited to a particular kind of mother—white, Christian, 
middle-class. It developed symbiotically with the ideal of a nuclear family, 
serving both capitalist and racial segregation goals.23 While “elevating the 
psychological, spiritual, and even civic contributions of women in the home,”24 
the maternalist ideology excluded vast numbers of women, including working 
class, African-American, and immigrant women.25 Unmarried mothers, 
particularly women of color, were posited as the opposite of the ‘angel in the 
house,’ unchaste and unworthy of state assistance.26 
The moral mother icon waned post-World War I, but was reinvigorated in 
the form of the 1950s housewife.27 Although feminists had long opposed this 
biologically determined model, the disaggregation of women from maternity 
only really gained traction in the 1970s. Psychologists, biologists, and others 
argued for roles for women outside of the home, for equal parenting from men, 
and for a recognition of the diversity of mothers that had always existed.28 
Despite gains in this regard, women continue to be defined in large part by 
their reproductive and caregiving roles. As Martha Fineman argues, “women 
will be treated as mothers (or potential mothers)” regardless of their own 
desires or other roles.29 Women who do not mother, by incapacity or worse by 
choice, continue to be regarded as unnatural.30 
 
 22. Bloch, supra note 14, at 120. 
 23. VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 7, at 34, 119; see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing 
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183–97 (2001) (arguing that 
parenthood is shaped by capitalism and racism). 
 24. VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 7, at 31. 
 25. ANDREA O’REILLY, TONI MORRISON AND MOTHERHOOD: A POLITICS OF THE HEART 
128 (“[O]nly white and middle-class women could wear the halo of the Madonna and transform the 
world through their moral influence and social housekeeping.”). 
 26. GORDON, supra note 21 at 45 (noting that other single mothers, particularly widows, were 
contrasted as “deserving and ‘innocent’ supplicants” for state aid). The ‘angel in the house’ is a 
popular cultural construct of Victorian womanhood as devoted to husband and children, passive, and 
“above all, pure.” See Alexandra Cheira, From the Angel in the House to the Babe in Total Control of 
Herself: A Critique of the Cultural Constructions of Female Power(lessness), in Women Past and 
Present: Biographic and Multidisciplinary Studies 106, 106 (Maria Zina Goncalves de Abreu and 
Steve Fleetwood eds., 2014). 
 27. VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 7, at 182 (describing depictions of domestic goddesses 
like Harriet Nelson of the popular sitcom Ozzie and Harriet). 
 28. To cite just one influential example, Nancy Chodorow debunked the myth that mothers 
are inherently better caregivers than men. This demonstrated that maternity is largely transmitted 
through culture and psychology rather than biology. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF 
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978). 
 29. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 38 (1995). 
 30. Franke, supra note 23, at 185. 
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Indeed, the idolatry of motherhood still permeates our culture and legal 
system.31 Jennifer Collins has documented how the criminal justice system 
continues to romanticize the mother-child relationship, or at least that of 
certain mothers.32 One particularly lasting stereotype is the mother as all-
sacrificing caregiver.33 Dorothy Roberts and others have pointed out that 
mothers who do not meet this or other feminine stereotypes, often those who 
are minority or poor, are punished most severely.34 Perversely, mothers who 
“appear pathetically weak or deranged” and, as a result, do not protect their 
children are treated more leniently than those who resist their gendered 
subservience and appear strong.35 Maternal status not only creates criminal 
liability but also leads to particularly harsh sanctions.36 Permeating family law 
too, “[t]he fantasy of the perfect and all powerful mother” prioritizes women’s 
caregiving over more public roles, and blames less-than-perfect mothers for 
every childhood problem.37 Even women’s civic presence is often still defined 
by maternity. To take just one example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD) successfully harnessed the moral authority of motherhood to reform 
criminal law.38 
Commentators have noted the recent rise of a robust new form of 
maternalism. Naomi Mezey and Cornelia Pillard describe how political 
activists from both the right and the left engage in a “revived veneration of 
motherhood and female domesticity.”39 Coupled with increased cultural 
pressure for parents to be perfect, this “new” maternalism hinders women in 
numerous ways.40 It impedes them at the workplace, and rolls back gains in 
 
 31. See VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 7, at 282 (arguing that, although the moral 
motherhood ideal “has never been attainable for the majority of Americans[,] . . . it has had a 
tenacious hold on American culture.”). 
 32. Jennifer Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s 
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 
152 (2000).  
 34. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1993). 
 35. Dorothy E. Roberts, Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children, in MOTHER TROUBLES 
31, 40 (1999). 
 36. Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 818 (2000) (“Because women are so closely identified with their children, they 
are treated particularly harshly for alleged crimes against [them].”). 
 37. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 366 (1996). 
 38. Numerous examples abound including Sarah Palin’s “Mama Grizzly” campaign to 
mobilize conservative women or the EcoMom alliance for environmental activism. See Naomi Mezey 
& Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 246, 250–51 
(2012). 
 39. Mezey & Pillard, supra note 38, at 232. 
 40. See, e.g, Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 
1230 (2011) (describing these pressures and their harms). The pressures of helicopter parenting are 
not, of course, limited to women. But mothers still bear the biggest brunt. See id. 
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shared caregiving with fathers.41 The “Tiger Mom” is praised while the ‘free-
range’ mom and the woman who publicly declares to love her husband more 
than her children are pilloried.42 Although the new maternalism depicts a “hip, 
empowered, confident, and appealing version of ‘Mom’” rather than a 
traditional and demure housewife, it continues to ignore the majority of 
mothers.43 The denigration of non-normative single mothers, usually poor, has 
not abated.44 Yet even the affluent are not exempt from judgment. The 
portrayal of working women as callous and selfish reflects the ongoing 
restrictions on choices even for privileged women.45 
II.  
OBERGEFELL AND CARHART 
Two-thirds of the Obergefell plaintiffs, including one hundred percent of 
the female plaintiffs, have children.46 This is much higher than the below 
eighteen percent of same-sex couples who are parents.47 The plaintiffs’ 
children have received much fanfare; they have been interviewed and 
 
 41. Mezey & Pillard, supra note 38; at 272-73, 277-78; see also David Leonhardt, A Labor 
Market Punishing to Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/business/ 
economy/04leonhardt.html [http://perma.cc/CK5D-V33N] (noting that while women have made 
strides in the labor market, mothers continue to be penalized, and remarking that the three recent male 
nominees to the Supreme Court have had children, while the last three women have all been 
childless). 
 42. For example, law professor Amy Chua’s book BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER 
(2011) was a best- seller and, although igniting controversy, earned much praise. By contrast, when 
journalist Lenore Skenazy wrote a column describing letting her nine-year-old ride the subway 
alone—a common parenting practice in the 1970s and 1980s—she was criticized as “the World’s 
Worst Mom.” See Are Modern Kids Coddled, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2008), 
http://www.newsweek.com/are-modern-kids-coddled-85739 [http://perma.cc/KCY8-35JE] 
(describing the controversy). Finally, when a writer declared her love for her husband over her 
children, again something that historically was quite mainstream, she prompted a tidal wave of angry 
responses and criticisms of her mothering and herself. Ayelet Waldman, Truly, Madly, Guiltily, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/fashion/truly-madly-guiltily.html 
[https://perma.cc/ 
BVL3-D7L2] (and comments). 
 43. Mezey & Pillard, supra note 37 at 271 (describing the effect on lower-income and 
minority mothers); see also Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 (2008) (describing the erasure of 
the many families who engage in caregiving arrangements not centered on the isolated nuclear 
family). 
 44. See generally Karyn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of 
Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2013) (outlining the ongoing persecution of low-
income mothers, particularly those receiving public assistance). 
 45. See generally Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991) (describing the continuity of a paradigm of selfless motherhood and its 
contribution to gender inequality). 
 46. Godsoe, supra note 1, at n. 6–7. 
 47. See GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED 
SAME-SEX COUPLES: ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2015), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Demographics-Same-Sex-Couples-
ACS2013-March-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CQN-E6SA]. 
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photographed hundreds of times.48 Undoubtedly, the same-sex marriage 
decision and the numerous plaintiffs who are fathers erode stereotypes of men, 
particularly gay men, as uninterested in family or even predators.49 Parenthood 
remains very gendered, disadvantaging both men and women, and the 
disproportionately high number of fathers in Obergefell helps “unsex” 
parenthood.50 Nonetheless, the parents most featured in the case, and 
particularly the opinion, are a lesbian couple whose motherhood dominates 
their story. 51 
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse originally challenged Michigan’s same-
sex adoption prohibition, only later adding a challenge to the marriage ban.52 
The couple have adopted four foster children with special needs. One was so 
disabled that doctors predicted he would die, but he is now thriving thanks to a 
combination of what Rowse describes as “God and a mother’s love.”53 The 
media and pleadings have centered almost exclusively on the couple’s 
parenting; most photos depict the couple surrounded by their children.54 Lower 
 
 48. See, e.g., Amanda Terkel, Kate Abbey-Lambertz & Christine Conetta, Meet the Couples 
Fighting to Make Marriage Equality the Law of the Land, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/17/supreme-court-marriage-_n_7604396.html 
[http://perma.cc/QH4G-58ZE]. See also Associated Press, Two Kellys Raising Baby as Loving, If Not 
Legal, Parents, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 16, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-
3042273/Two-Kellys-raising-baby-loving-not-legal-parents.html [http://perma.cc/FV2H-PCMT] 
(portraying a couple with their baby); Amanda Terkel & Christine Conetta, “Just As Boring and 
Crazy And Loud As Any Other Family,” HUFFINGTON POST (April 20, 2015, 8:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/20/paul-campion-randy-johnson_n_7057500.html 
[http://perma.cc/XH5A-D2B3] (interviewing the children of one plaintiff). 
 49. DANIEL WINUNWE RIVERS, RADICAL RELATIONS: LESBIAN MOTHERS, GAY FATHERS 
& THEIR CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II 8 (2013) (outlining these 
stereotypes). 
 50. Sixteen percent of gay men have children, versus fifty percent of the Obergefell plaintiffs. 
See Gary Gates and Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of U.S. Adults Identify as LGBT, 
GALLUP.COM, (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-
lgbt.aspx [http://perma.cc/7HJY-7WTW]. . I have discussed above the disadvantages to women of 
these parental gender stereotypes. Men are disadvantaged by assumptions that they are not as good 
caregivers as women, and that men should be breadwinners. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, Like 
Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J. 
L. & FEMINISM 257 (2009) (demonstrating that numerous gendered stereotypes continue to permeate 
parenthood decisions, often particularly persecuting men); Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: 
Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57 (2012) (arguing for disentangling 
parenthood roles from biology). 
 51. Other female couples were also depicted in the media primarily as mothers. See, e.g., Dan 
Sewell, Two Kellys Raising Baby As Loving, If Not Legal, Parents, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16 
2015), http://news.yahoo.com/two-kellys-raising-baby-loving-not-legal-parents-170937372.html 
[http://perma.cc/55ZN-U29Y]. I focus here on Rowse and DeBoer because they are the only female 
plaintiff couples who Justice Kennedy discusses in the opinion. 
 52. Godsoe, supra note 1. 
 53. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Meet the “Accidental Activists” of the Supreme Court’s Same-
Sex Marriage Case, NPR (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/401007033/meet-the-
accidental-activists-of-the-supreme-courts-same-sex-marriage-case [http://perma.cc/5JX3-8NDR]. 
 54. Totenberg, supra note 53; see also Jerry Markon, Meet the Couples Who Will Be Part of 
History in the Same-Sex Marriage Battle, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), 
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courts have effusively praised both women’s “personal sacrifices” in parenting 
and detailed how the women, both nurses, “coordinate their work schedules” to 
care for the children and “attend to their medical needs.”55 Like female 
activists of old, Rowse and DeBoer describe their political action as derived 
exclusively from their maternal role; they were “too busy” parenting and 
working to “get too involved” in the same-sex marriage debate.56 They brought 
suit only to help their children. Rowse portrays them as “just two parents that 
want to take care of our kids and if that means going for [] marriage, that’s 
what it is.”57 DeBoer also emphasizes their intertwined maternal and activist 
roles: “We’d go home, we’d shed our activism clothes and we put on the mom 
clothes.”58 
Justice Kennedy poetically describes the couple’s motherhood. The male 
plaintiffs he calls out in his opinion are childless. He focuses instead on their 
relationships with their partners and, in the case of Ijpe DeKoe, on his civic 
service as a soldier.59 Justice Kennedy’s depiction of the women, in contrast, 
could be referring to the mothers of nineteenth century literature (like Mrs. 
March of Little Women) or 1950s television (such as Harriet Nelson of Ozzie 
and Harriet).60 The women’s professions are mentioned only in passing 
(although they are both in the predominantly female occupation of nursing). 
The Court spends a paragraph detailing their fostering and adoption of four 
children, noting, as did lower courts, that those children were “abandoned” by 
their biological (read, bad) mothers.61 There is scant mention of the couple’s 
relationship, and the couple’s impetus for seeking to marry is framed as driven 
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stability all mothers desire to protect their children,” rather than to ensure their 
security as partners or to achieve recognition of their adult relationship.62 
The opinion thus bolsters the dual-gender parenthood arguments put forth 
by same-sex marriage opponents, and invokes the public/private spheres 
distinction. Dual parenthood roles often designate mothers as caregivers and 
fathers as breadwinners.63 By ignoring the male plaintiffs’ fatherhood and 
focusing so heavily on motherhood, Obergefell reflects this traditional division 
of labor. Relatedly, men’s civic participation is framed in terms of their 
profession, and women’s in terms of their family status. In her seminal history 
of social policy in the United States, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, Theda 
Skopcol describes the initial provision of benefits in the United States to two 
groups deemed worthy, Civil War veterans and mothers.64 Obergefell’s 
treatment of the male and female plaintiffs retrenches this historic dichotomy. 
Whereas men merit same-sex marriage as citizens, particularly those who 
served in the military, women earn government benefits through mothering. 
This romanticized view of a mother’s love and protective impulses 
echoes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.65 In restricting access to abortion, 
Justice Kennedy expresses an essentialist view of women as determined by 
their ability to procreate and their inherent desire to mother. Accordingly, 
“[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the 
mother has for her child.”66 Despite acknowledging a lack of data on the issue, 
Justice Kennedy concludes that some women “come to regret” abortion and 
suffer “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem” as a result.67 Protecting women 
from hastily denying their destiny as mothers and suffering for it later thus 
serves as the main justification for banning partial-birth abortions. 
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This maternalist reasoning was vehemently criticized, both by other 
Justices and by scholars. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg connects the 
majority’s reasoning to “ancient notions about women’s place in the family 
and under the Constitution—ideas that have long been discredited.”68 Anita 
Allen sarcastically describes this “self-evident metaphysic of true womanhood” 
as “naturally tender” towards children, and primarily, if not exclusively, 
defined by their roles in the home rather than the public sphere.69 Those who 
do not want maternity, who terminate a pregnancy, are deemed deviant; “a true 
‘mother’ would recoil at discovering her physician had [performed a 
“ghoulish” late-birth abortion on] her unborn ‘child.’”70 The state is thus 
justified, as Reva Seigel puts it, in restricting women’s access to abortion to 
“free women to be the mothers they naturally [and by divine-order] are.”71 
Denying the social construction of motherhood, Carhart posits maternity as 
women’s natural state. 
My claim here is not that the Court’s praise of DeBoer and Rowse, who 
do seem to be exemplary parents, is as harmful to women as the veneration of 
mother-love in Carhart. It certainly is not. The very different outcomes of 
Carhart and Obergefell further magnify this distinction; the former limits 
women’s reproductive freedom while the latter expands their opportunity to 
choose whom they will love. Nonetheless, even well-intended maternalism 
brings some harm. Reifying motherhood reinscribes women’s purported 
natural place in the private sphere, cabining them in this secondary realm. 
Supreme Court decisions are important not only for their outcomes, but also 
for their reasoning and expressive messages. Even the most beneficial 
outcomes can bring countervailing costs. Carhart immediately inspired, as it 
should have, robust criticism of both its outcome and its reasoning. The 
undeniably progressive outcome of Obergefell may obscure the drawbacks that 
accompany it. This Essay is an effort to point out one such drawback—the re-
inscription of essentialist gender roles in the family and polity. 
CONCLUSION 
Rowse and DeBoer married this August. Their children walked down the 
aisle with Rowse and said their own vows, taking both women as their “legal 
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momm[ies].”72 Guests at the wedding toasted the couple, praising them as 
“loving parents” and “two mothers . . . heroines of our time.”73 The newlyweds 
will take a “familymoon” with their children, rather than a romantic 
honeymoon.74 
The wedding is a fitting capstone to the couple’s struggle to adopt and 
marry. Yet its framing also perpetuates the message that mothers must be 
perfect, have no apparent intimate life apart from their children, and sacrifice 
all for them. This story of same-sex marriage embedded in Obergefell reflects 
the ongoing conflation of womanhood with maternity. Concomitantly, it 
diminishes women’s potential other selves, as lovers, workers, and citizens. 
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